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Class Actions Under the Truth
in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act' is a response by Congress to the many
and varied methods used by creditors to state the interest rates on
consumer loans.2 The purpose of the Act is to prescribe a uniform
method of stating the interest rate on consumer loans and thereby
enable consumers to compare more easily the various credit terms
and to avoid the uninformed use of credit.3
While the purpose of the Act was clear, the means of enforcing it
were not so obvious. The Senate version of the Truth in Lending
Act relied on private enforcement to effectuate the terms of the Act.4
It provided for jurisdiction in the federal district courts without
regard to a minimum jurisdictional amount5 and also provided an
individual with incentive to litigate: A successful plaintiff would
recover statutory damages of twice the amount of the finance charge
imposed in the transaction, with a minimum of $100, plus reason-
able attorney's fees and' court costs.6
The House amended the Senate bill by providing for enforcement
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other agencies7 largely
because it feared that the small purchaser and the poor would not
be able to adequately protect their rights and enforce the Act.8
It also retained the $100 minimum statutory damages provision, as
an incentive for enforcement by private litigation. The Truth in
Lending Act thus contained both administrative and private enforce-
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-44 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the Truth in Lending Act].
2. Hearings on S.5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as S.5 Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs
of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 76
(1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 11601 Hearings]; 113 CONG. REc. 18399-400 (1967) (remarks
of Sen. Proxmire, sponsor of the Truth in Lending Act).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
4. 113 CONG. REC. 18401-02 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). The Senate rejected
administrative enforcement of the Act by either a new or existing agency because of the
fear that a burdensome bureaucracy would be required to police the nation's numerous
small creditors adequately. Id. See also Hearings on S.2755 Before the Subcomm. on
Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 321 (1960) [hereinafter cited as S.2755 Hearings]. By the time the Senate passed
the bill even Senator Bennett. the principal critic of Truth in Lending, recognized
self-enforcement as one of the bill's virtues. 113 CONG. REC. 18409 (1967).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970).
8. H.R. 11601 Hearings, supra note 2, at 240, 807, 828; 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1975.
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ment provisions, but Congress did not indicate when one or the other
would be the preferred enforcement mechanism.9
The Truth in Lending Act thus emerged with a confusing scheme
of enforcement, particularly regarding actions involving large num-
bers of people. Congress never foresaw the problem class actions
would present:' 0 Multiplication of the individual minimum recovery
of $100 by the number of members of a large class makes potential
liability astronomical. Soon after the remedial provisions of the Act
became effective,"' a number of plaintiffs filed class action suits
seeking damages as high as a billion dollars.' 2
The substantive law and procedure interact in many subtle ways
in other areas of the law,' 3 but in the case of class actions brought
under the Truth in Lending Act the union of substance and pro-
cedure has given birth to the prospect of damages which might finan-
cially destroy or cripple major credit institutions. This teratological
offspring of Rule 23 and the Truth in Lending Act has played a
major role in the procedural decision to allow a suit to proceed as a
class action, a decision usually made before a decision on the merits,' 4
9. Compare 114 CONG. REc. 14489 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire), with H.R.
REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Administrative enforcement and private
enforcement are complementary remedies; they are not mutually exclusive. McDermott
v. Hollander, Civil No. 72-2062 (E.D La., June 28, 1973).
10. There is no mention of class action recovery in any of the legislative pro-
ceedings on Truth in Lending. See Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1305, 1307 (1972).
11. The Truth in Lending Act became effective May 29, 1968. Act of May 29, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 504(a), 82 Stat. 167. The civil liability section did not become
effective until July 1, 1969. Id. § 504(b). Congress provided for a, period between ef-
fectiveness of the Act and effectiveness of the civil liability section to enable the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to issue the regulations required under
the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). The regulations of the Board of Governors are known
as Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1973).
12. Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (potential damages
of $1 billion); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (po-
tential damages in the companion Mullen case of $8 billion). Other cases in which
the potential liability has been high include Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha,
Civil Nos. 72-0-156, 82-0-157 (D. Neb., June 20, 1973) (liability alleged to be $17.5
million); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (liability could
be as high as $200 million per month for the Midcontinent Area alone); Kroll v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (liability alleged to be $68 million);
Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (liability al-
leged to be $25 million); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1972),
af 'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973) (liability alleged to be $18 million); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (liability alleged
to be $13 million); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D.
Pa. 1971), rev'd on rehearing en banc, Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974) (lia-
bility alleged to be $60 million). All unreported cases cited in this Note may be found
in Brief for Appellant, Appendix, Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., Civil No. 72-1054 (3d
Cir., Mar. 15, 1974).
13. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 4, 5
(Temp. 2d ed. 1968); 2 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 853, 859 (1973).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) requires that the determination whether the class action
may be maintained be made as soon as practicable after commencement of the action.
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and it also has had a major impact on shaping the substantive Truth
in Lending doctrine.
This Note examines the question of when, if ever, a class action
should be allowed under the Truth in Lending Act. It analyzes the
three approaches the courts have taken and the subsequent congres-
sional response, and it explores possible solutions to the problem.
I
By the time the Truth in Lending Act's enforcement provisions
were fourteen months old, at least eighteen class action suits had been
filed under the Act. 1- The courts were on the whole favorable, cer-
tifying eight class actions and denying three prior to February 1972.10
After Judge Frankel denied class action status in Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Company,' 7 there was a marked change in judi-
cial attitude toward class actions under the Act. Between February 14,
1972, the date of the Ratner decision, and November 29, 1972, the
date of Eovaldi v. First National Bank of Chicago,'s the courts denied
twenty-one class actions alleging Truth in Lending violations while
allowing only two.19
15. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1970, at 18, col. 1.
16. Prior to February 1972, the date of the Ratner decision, the courts certified
eight class actions in Truth in Lending cases and denied three. S. REP. No. 278, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). Those cases allowing class actions are: Joseph v. Norman's
Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Smith v. International Magazine
Serv. of Mid. AtI., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CoNsMr CREDIT GUIDE
99,249 (N.D. W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1973); Douglas v. Beneficial
Fin. Co. of Anchorage, 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971); Berkman v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH C6NssmIaR CREDIT GUIDE 99,270 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on rehearing
en bane, Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1971); Seattle v. Mallicott Auto Sales,
Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIr GUIDE 99,089 (D. Ore.
1971); Richardson v. Time Premium Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CON-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,273 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Martin & Alexander v. Family Publi-
cations Serv., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,267
(D. Vt. 1970). The only reported case denying a class action under the Truth in Lending
Act prior to Ratner is Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
17. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). An earlier decision granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. 329 F. Supp. 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
18. 57,F.R.D. 545 (N.D. II. 1972).
19. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973) (erroneously stating that only
one case allowed a class action).
Many of the cases deciding class action status are unreported. Cases denying class
actions include: Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Alsup
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Rodriquez v. Family
Publications Serv., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. I1. 1972); Johnson v. Austin Furniture, Inc., Civil No.
72-C-724 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 11, 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D.
587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70-C-1827 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 20, 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., Civil No. 71-686 Phx WPC
(D. Ariz., Aug. 15, 1972); Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civil No. 71-1271 (E.D. La.
Aug. 7, 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc. of Milwaukee, 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D.
Wisc. 1972); Greer v. Sears, Roebuck &- Co., Civil No. 72-80 CH (S.D. W. Va., July 3,
1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Grubb v.
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The plaintiff in Ratner alleged that Chemical Bank had violated
the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act by failing
to show the annual percentage rate on a Master Charge card monthly
statement, even though no finance charge had yet been imposed and
no interest rate had yet been applied.20 The alleged class21 was com-
posed of 130,000 Master Charge credit card holders which multiplied
Chemical Bank's potential liability under the minimum statutory
damages of $100 per person to $13 million.22
Judge Frankel denied class action certification on three grounds2 3
Dollar Loan Co., Civil Nos. 15550, 15976 (N.D. Ga., May 25, 1972); Roesel v. Fulton
Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, Civil No. 15376 (N.D. Ga., May 25, 1972); Wilcox v. Commerce
Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Shields v.
Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1972) (mistakenly reported as
1971); Kenny v. Landis Fin. Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Rogers
v. Coburn Fin. Corp. of DeKalb, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The two cases allowing the class action were Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Flickinger v. Horseshoe Dev. Corp., Civil No. 11-334-
C-I (S.D. Iowa, Mar. 10, 1972).
20. 329 F. Supp. at 272.
21. Ratner had also submitted a motion for summary judgment, and Chemical
Bank had moved to dismiss. The parties agreed to hear these motions before hearing
the class action motion. Judge Frankel granted Ratner's motion for summary judgment,
329 F. Supp. at 282, and in the subsequent hearing was faced with the problem of
determining class action status.
22. 54 F.R.D. at 413.
23. Judge Frankel first denied class action certification under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) and
Rule 23(b)(1)(B). A class action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) if the prose-
cution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class .... ." At the
time that Judge Frankel ruled on class action status, the Chemical Bank was in
conformity with the Truth in Lending Act disclosure requirements. The bank was
therefore not open to a legitimate suit for more disclosure. Since it was also un-
likely that someone would or could successfully sue for less disclosure, there was no
danger that the bank would be exposed to varying adjudication. There was thus
no need for a class action under Rule 23(b)(l)(A). 54 F.R.D. at 415. Contra, Smith v.
International Magazine Serv. of Mid Atlantic, Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,249 (N.D. W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir.
1973); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) provides that a class action is maintainable if prosecution of separate
actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests ....
In Ratner Judge Frankel had granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
on the merits prior to the determination of class action status, 54 F.R.D. at 412. Thus
the only effect of denial of class action status on absent class members would be the
stare decisis effect of this earlier decision, an effect not generally regarded as suf-
ficient to warrant a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) suit. See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAMCCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1772-74, 1781 (1972); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.31
(197,1).
However, the decision to disallow the class action would possibly affect the right
of other class members to bring an action. Since the one year statute of limitations
had run, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e) (Supp. 1974), other class members could not bring an
individual action unless they could show reliance on the pending class action as a
reason for not previously filing an action. Hunter v. Gross Bros. Furniture, Inc.,
Civil No. C-71-2443 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 20, 1972).
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of which the most important was lack of "superiority" of the class
action to other procedural methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy under Rule 23(b)(3).24
The court ruled first that the Act contemplated enforcement by
a species of private attorney general. 25 Since the validity of an action
by an individual was guaranteed by the provisions for a minimum
recovery of $100 plus reasonable attorney's fees, the incentive of a
class action was unnecessary to enforce the Act.26
Second, the (b) (3) class action was not superior because the pro-
posed recovery of $100 for 130,000 people would be a "horrendous,
possibly annihilating punishment" for what was at most a "technical"
violation. 27 Speaking more broadly of Rule 23(b), Judge Frankel said
that granting certification of a class action required the exercise of
a "pragmatic discretion" and that the consequences of a class action
in the case would be absurd.28
If the Ratner decision is confined by the fact that plaintiff did not
allege actual damages for himself or for the class, the holding of the
case is correct. The decision proceeds from the lack of an allegation
24. Rule 23(b)(3) imposes two requirements on the certification of a (b)(3) class.
First, the court must find that the "questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members .... "
The Advisory Committee's Notes to amended Rule 23 explain that "it is only where
this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action
device." The Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). For further ex-
planation of this requirement see 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[2] (1974);
Note, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation-Catch 22 il Rule
23, 10 HOUSTON L. REy. 337, 358 (1973).
The second requirement, "the superiority requirement," provides that the class ac-
tion must be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. To aid in the evaluation of these requirements the Rule also
lists four factors as follows: 1) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the action; 2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced; 3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation in the particular forum; 4) the difficulties of managing the class action.
The "superiority" requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) was influenced by a Weinstein
article suggesting that before certifying the class the procedure should be evaluated
in light of the other procedural devices of joinder, jurisdiction and service, inter-
vention, consolidation, joint trials, stays, stare decisis, summary judgment, the test
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433, 438-48 (1960). See also Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 from A Judge's Point of View, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 298
(1966).
Commentators have noted that the criteria for determining the predominance of
common questions and superiority are so generalized that they serve less as a judicial
screen than as a yardstick of managerial power. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[2]
(1974); Note, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation-Catch 22
in Rule 23, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 337, 366 (1973). See also Order of Feb. 28, 1966 (with
amended rules), 383 U.S. 1031-32 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
25. 54 F.R.D. at 413; see p. 1416 infra.
26. 54 F.R.D. at 416.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 414.
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of actual damages to the conclusion that an individual action is the
superior form of adjudication. The $100 minimum recovery was con-
sidered to be a sufficient incentive to encourage an individual plain-
tiff to litigate.2 0 If a person could litigate and correct the disclosure
error, the class action would be unnecessary and even absurd. Ratner
is also correct in not imposing the "annihilating" punishment of $13
million on Chemical Bank. In the absence of any actual damages it
is difficult to envisage a set of social priorities that would justify such
a draconian outcome.3 0
Courts subsequently applying the Ratner decision 3 ' have failed to
recognize that the lack of actual damages was necessary to Judge
Frankel's conclusion that the class action was inappropriate. 32 They
have transmuted the Ratner result, that a (b)(3) class action is not a
"superior" procedure, into a theory about congressional intent: The
Truth in Lending Act's provision for incentives for individual litiga-
tion has been read to preclude class actions.3 3
Divination of congressional intent from the structure of a statutory
scheme is a legitimate method of judicial reasoning.34 In the case of
29. 113 CONG. REC. 18401-02 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
30. Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915,
918 (1971).
31. See Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Civil Nos. 72-0-156, 82-0-157 (D. Neb.,
June 20, 1973); Steelreath v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Mobile, Civil No.
6799-71-P (S.D. Ala., May 23, 1973); Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., Civil No.
72-1339 (E.D. La., Apr. 27, 1973); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1973 Trade
Cas. f 74,469 at 94088 (D.D.C., Apr. 24, 1973); Lindig v. City Nat'l Bank, Civil No.
72-79 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 14, 1973); Roth v Community Nat'l Bank, Civil No. C-72-1031
(N.D. Ohio, Mar. 13, 1973); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 608 (N.D.
I1. 1973); Winston v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, Civil No. 71-1986 (E.D.
La., Feb. 9, 1973); Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Rodriquez v.
Family Publications Serv., 57 F.R.D. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1972,; Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi-
cago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civil No.
71-1271 (E.D. La., Aug. 7, 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc. of Milwaukee,
56 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Roesel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, Civil
No. 15376 (N.D. Ga., May 25, 1972); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 136
(D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Kenny v. Landis Fin. Group, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 939, 952 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp. of DeKalb, 54
F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- 32. Judge Frankel confined his decision to the "molecular purpose" of deciding the
appropriateness of the class action given the facts of the case at hand. 54 F.R.D. at 413.
He made clear that he was making "no sweeping pronouncements" on the propriety
of all class actions under Truth in Lending. Id. Although Judge Frankel considered
the lack of actual damages to be of great importance, he only mentioned the ab-
sence of damages in a footnote at the end of the opinion. 54 F.R.D. at 416 n.7.
33. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Civil Nos. 72-0-156, 82-0-157 (D. Nell.,
June 20, 1973); Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., Civil No. 72-1339 (E.D. La., Apr.
27, 1973); Roth v. Community Nat'l Bank, Civil No. C-72-1031 (ND. Ohio, Mar. 13,
1973); Winston v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans. Civil No. 71-1986 (E.D.
La., Feb. 9, 1973); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70C-1827 (iN.D. Ill., Sept. 20, 1972).
34. .See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
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enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act, however, the evidence is
not at all clear that Congress intended to bar the use of the class action.
Congressional silence does not imply congressional rejection of the
class action procedure. Class actions have been extensively used with-
out specific authorization by Congress in antitrust and securities liti-
gation.33 Since class actions were a part of the existing body of law
when the Truth in Lending Act was passed, one might just as easily
conclude that congressional silence was an endorsement of existing
procedure. 36
A second flaw in the reasoning that a (b)(3) class action is not a
superior procedure under Truth in Lending is that class actions are
necessary to the Act's enforcement scheme. The argument that the
incentive for individual litigation precludes class action litigation
assumes that incentive relates solely to the consumer incentive to
bring an action, and disregards the creditor incentive to comply with
the Act. The statutory minimum damage provision was enacted as
much to induce creditor compliance as it was to provide incentives
for private litigants. 37 Private enforcement and particularly class ac-
tion enforcement 8 remain important aspects of the statutory scheme,
a fact recognized by Congress in recent committee reports on pending
legislation. 39
In addition to undercutting enforcement, use of the Rule 23(b)(3)
superiority requirement to eliminate class actions under Truth in
35. See notes 161, 162 infra.
36. In other circumstances Congress has limited class actions to a situation where
class members give written consent to the class representative to proceed on their
behalf. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (Supp. 1974).
37. The Act as originally passed in the Senate relied completely on private en-
forcement to secure creditor compliance. See sources cited in note 4 supra. Even
though the House version of the bill added administrative enforcement, the large
number of creditors involved precluded enforcement solely by administrative agencies.
The FTC has enforcement responsibility over 95 percent of all consumer creditors.
Feldman, F.T.C. Enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act-One Year Later, 26 Bus.
LAw. 835 (1971). In the first year Truth in Lending was in effect, the FTC in-
stituted 19,496 investigations resulting in three final cease and desist orders. Id. at 841
n.6. Mr. Feldman, a member of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, noted
with concern that private civil actions were not playing an effective role in enforcing
creditor compliance. Id. at 843.
The FTC's enforcement role is also restricted by a limited budget and staff. In
1970, the estimated FTC budget allocated to enforcement of Truth in Lending was
$1.700,000. Braucher, Administrative Enforcement Including Licensing, 26 Bus. LAW.
907, 913 (1971).
38. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). During the year 1971, 49 of
71 civil actions under Truth in Lending sought class action status. FRB Report to
Congress on Truth in Lending, 1971, reprinted in R. CLONTZ, TRUTH IN LENDING
MANUAL 11 (Supp. 1972).
39. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). Pending legislation is discussed
at p. 1429 infra.
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Lending denies the Rule 23 purpose of affording relief to widespread
harm. If an individual action precludes a class action under Truth
in Lending, the relief afforded is first, damages awarded to the indi-
vidual, and second, correction of the disclosure error. The class is
restricted in the collection of damages 40 and the Rule 23 purpose of
affording relief to widespread harm is effectively limited to correc-
tion of the disclosure error.41 If the members of the class have suf-
fered damages, it follows that class action recovery of those damages
is warranted, or at least superior to an individual action whose only
practical effect is to correct a disclosure violation.
Roth v. Community National Bank42 is an example of a case which
misinterpreted Ratner to deny class actions status to all suits brought
under the Truth in Lending Act. The Roth court concluded that the
individual incentive argument was sufficient to deny class action
status where actual damages in excess of the $100 minimum were
alleged for a class of 1,500 people.43 Since Truth in Lending con-
templated individual litigation there was even less justification for
40. The class is restricted in the collection of damages by at least three factors:
the short one year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970); the inability of
the poor and uninformed to enforce their rights, see p. 1410 supra; and the im-
probability that large numbers of the class members will come forward on their own
to litigate.
41. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit relief under Truth in
Lending to correction of the disclosure error. On the contrary, there is some evidence
that Congress foresaw actual damages to individuals on a class scale as a result of
inadequate credit disclosure. Congress declared that the Act's purpose is to enable
the consumer to more readily compare the various credit terms and "avoid the unin-
formed use of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). There was certainly a fear that the
poor were often being gouged by creditors. See note 63 supra. Congress did not limit
the award to a successful plaintiff to a fixed statutory penalty. Rather, the provision
for an award of twice the finance charge imposed in the transaction explicitly
recognized that actual damages may exceed the minimum penalty of $100. Proof of
actual damages from a disclosure failure is difficult at best. 119 CONG. REC. S14423
(daily ed. July 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); see Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 413 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The remedy was not framed in
terms of damages but in terms of the "finance charge" imposed. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(1970). Congress seemed to feel that a consumer could not be damaged more than the
total finance charge imposed.
A second kind of damage to the consumer was also foreseen-the cost of an inefficient
credit market. The various and confusing means of stating the finance charge on
credit extended were seen as precluding the consumer from selection of the cheapest
credit source available to him. 113 CONG. REc. 18400 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
This imperfect competition for credit allowed creditors to impose higher finance
charges. In this context the disclosure provisions were a way to overcome credit ig-
norance by educating the consumer, and thereby to induce price competition in credit.
113 CONG. REC. 18401 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). A creditor violating the dis-
closure provisions would be disrupting the competition of the consumer credit mar-
ketplace and imposing a harm very similar to the harm proscribed by the antitrust laws
-interference with the competitive market.
42. Civil No. C-72-1031 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 13, 1973).
43. Id.; accord, Pennino v. Morris Kirschman 9- Co., Civil No. 72-1339 (E.D. La.,
Apr. 27, 1973).
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a class action where more than the minimum in damages was in-
volved.44
Denying a class action where class members have suffered actual
damages not only effectively bars relief to those individuals 45 but
also rewards a guilty defendant with the fruits of his wrongdoing.
The total reliance on individual action to enforce rights is a step
backwards to a 19th century view of a society without computers,
standard forms, or mass marketing; Rule 23 is an attempt to adjust
judicial machinery to a world of mass production. 40 The retrogres-
sion suggested by the Ratner line of cases should not be lightly taken.
A final reason why the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority requirement
should not preclude class actions alleging Truth in Lending viola-
tions is that the denial of the class action looks to only one side of the
question of procedural fairness. Predominantly, the courts have echoed
Ratner's fear of imposing crushing damages on defendants, and have
found that the potential for large damages fails the (b)(3) superiority
requirement. 47 By their overriding concern for defendants, the courts
have allowed fairness to defendants to override fairness to plaintiffs.48
The Advisory Committee Notes to amended Rule 23 emphasize that
(b)(3) superiority is to be viewed with respect to adjudicating "the
total controversy." 49
In effect, denial of class action status because of the fear of large
damage awards allows the potential Truth in Lending violator to
limit recovery to a few individuals if the harm caused is widespread
enough. Neither the need to enforce Truth in Lending nor the theory
of Rule 23 would support this conclusion.
Some cases"° which deny class action status rely on a failure to meet
44. Civil No. C-72-1031 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 13, 1973).
45. See note 40 supra.
46. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58
F.R.D. 307, 308 (1972); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class
Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 305 (1972).
47. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Civil Nos. 720-156, 82-0-157 (D. Neb.,
June 20, 1973); Roth v. Community Nat'l Bank, Civil No. C-72-1031 (N.D. Ohio,
Mar. 13, 1973); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Goldman v.
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Kriger v. European
Health Spa, Inc., of Milwaukee, 56 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Wilcox v. Com-
merce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 137-38 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.
1973); Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp. of DeKalb, 54 F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
48. Cf. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1779, at 59 (1972);
Weinstein, supra note 46, at 305.
49. The Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
50. Class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) have also been alleged and denied in all of
the following cases: Alpert v. U.S. Indus., Inc., Civil No. 72-354-AAH (C.D. Cal., May
7, 1973); Coleman v. City Fin. Co., Inc., Civil No. 72-685-K (D. Md., Mar. 27, 1973);
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. 111. 1972); Alsup v. Mont-
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one or all of the requirements of Rule 23(a). 51 Most frequently the
courts have found that the person seeking to represent the class has
not met the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement that he "will fairly and ade-
quately" protect the class interests.52 Often this inadequate representa-
tion is a result of the class representative also being the class attor-
ney.53 The courts have been justifiably concerned with the conflict
of the dual role of the class attorney and the class representative. 54
Since a judgment in any class action will have res judicata effects on
all members of the class, c5 the adequacy of representation is particu-
larly important. 56 The obvious ethical questions, including solicita-
tion of clients,5 7 warrant finding that the class representative should
not be both the class attorney and the plaintiff.
Not all Rule 23(a) cases rest on such strong ground. For example,
Hunter v. Gross Brothers Furniture, Inc.58 held that none of Rule
gomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56
F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1972).
51. Rule 23(a) provides that a suit is maintainable as a class action only if: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all of the members is impractical, FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(1); 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.05 (1974); (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PLc'ricE
23.06-1 (1974); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); 3B MooRuE's FEDERAL
PRAC IcE 23.06-2 (1974); (4) the representative of the parties is able to represent
fairly and adequately those in the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTIcE 23.07 (1974). See also The Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100
(1966); Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff Under
Subsections (a 3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U. L. Rav. 406 (1973); Note, Man-
ageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 Mxcn.
L. REv. 338, 340 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Manageability].
52. Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1973 Trade Cas. 74,469 (D.D.C., Apr.
24, 1973); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., Civil No. 71-686 Pl WPC (D. Ariz., Aug. 15,
1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., of Milwaukee, 56 F.R.D. 104, 105 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Ariz. 1972);
Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1972).
53. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
54. The courts have pointed to two major conflicts. The first is that if the plaintiff
were required to testify, the ethical question of withdrawing as counsel would be
raised. Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., of Milwaukee, 56 F.R.D. 104, 105 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, EC 5-9 (1971). The
second conflict is a fear that the attorney's interest in his fee will conflict with his
interest as the class representative in securing relief for the class. Graybeal v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1973 Trade Cas. 74,469, at 94086 (D.D.C., Apr. 24, 1973); ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5 (1971).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); 3B MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.60 (1974); Note,
Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv.
426 (1973).
56. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56
F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1972); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1973 Trade
Cas. 74,469, at 94086 (D.D.C., Apr. 24, 1973); 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 143 (1972); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 171-72 (1969).
57. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2, EC 2-9 (1971); id. Canon 5.
58. Civil No. C-71-2443 RHS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 20, 1972).
1419
The Yale Law Journal
23(a)'s requirements had been met. Central to the reasoning was the
fact that the alleged class members had not shown a great interest in
the action; they seemed content "to let sleeping dogs lie."G9 This
reasoning comports with a traditional view that individuals should
enforce their own rights, but it denies one of Rule 23's purposes-
to protect the small and unwary claimant.60 The present Rule 23,
by adopting an "opt out" requirement rather than an "opt in" re-
quirement,"1 favors including within a class those persons who show
no interest in a pending suit.62 The legislative history of the Truth
in Lending Act also expresses a concern that those people who do
not enforce their rights either because of poverty or ignorance should
be protected by the Act.6 Clearly, the "let sleeping dogs lie" rationale
does not justify denial of class action status.
The courts have successfully used Rule 23's requirements to avoid
the problem of astronomical class recoveries under Truth in Lend-
ing, but in doing so they have twisted the substance of Truth in
Lending as well as the procedure of Rule 23. Yet the difficulty of
handling class actions for alleged Truth in Lending violations is also
highlighted by a second major line of cases which allow class action
status.
II
A major case certifying class action status is Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp. 4 Plaintiff alleged that Carte Blanche had not properly dis-
closed as part of the finance charge the annual membership dues,
the late charge assessed on unpaid bills, and the charges on the
59. Id. at 3. The court did not clearly state how the "let sleeping dogs lie" ra-
tionale related to one of Rule 23(a)'s requirements, but only said that the rationale
demonstrated the lack of a common bond between the class members.
60. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE 23.45[3] (1974); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A
Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav. 501, 507 (1969);
Kaplan, The Class Action-A Symposium (A Prefatory Note), 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REv. 497 (1969); Patrick & Cherner, Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages: A
Reply to the Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers, 28 Bus. LAWYER 1097,
1098-99 (1973); Weinstein, supra note 24, at 470; Wright, supra note 56, at 170; Note,
Stringent Notice Requirement and Rejection of the Fluid Class Recovery Severely Limit
Utility of the Class Action, 27 RUTGERS L. RFv. 212 (1973).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). An "opt out" requirement means all class members
are bound by the action absent a specific request for exclusion. An "opt in" require-
ment would include within the action only those class members requesting inclusion.
The Advisory Committee's Notes, S9 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966); Frankel, supra note 24, at 299.
62. Frankel, supra note 24, at 299; Note, supra note 24, at 347.
63. H.R. 11601 Hearings, supra note 2, at 828 (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); at 807
(statement of Pat Greathouse, Vice Pres. of the UAW); at 240 (statement of R. Sargent
Shriver).
64. 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on rehearing en banc,
Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974).
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extended payment plan for airline ticket purchases.65 The general
class of all 600,000 of defendant's credit cardholders was potentially
affected. Liability under Truth in Lending's $100 per person mini-
mum recovery totaled $60 million. 60 In the hearing to determine if
the alleged class met Rule 23(b)(3) requirements,67 Judge Teitel-
baum reviewed alternative procedures68 for handling the case and
found that a class action was superior to determine the issue of Carte
Blanche's liability.6 9 The case was then appealed to the Third Cir-
cuit.7 0
Over three strong dissents the Third Circuit en banc reversed the
trial court on the ground that the (b)(3) superiority finding was in
error, 71 and the case was remanded.72 However, the court was not
willing to deny relief to all of the members of the Katz class. The
question'of class action treatment of additional issues was left open,73
except that determination of the propriety of the class action would
be postponed until after the decision on the merits. 74
65. 52 F.R.D. at 512.
66. 53 F.R.D. at 540. There is some question whether the class consisted of 600,000
or 800,000 people. Carte Blanche urged that the class was 800,000 strong making total
damages .$80 million. Brief for Appellant at 3, Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., Civil No.
72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974). On the other hand, Katz urged that the class would
probably be much smaller, 40,000 to 60,000 people, making damages only $4 million.
Brief for Appellee at 43 n.31.
This curious situation of a plaintiff alleging damages smaller than the defendant
is a trial strategy. Defendant alleged a large class in the hope of making the total
amount of liability sought absurd, and thereby falling within the Ratner "annihilating
punishment" language. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D.
412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Plaintiff alleged a small class and less damages in the hope
of escaping the Ratner language.
67. In a previous hearing on the class action issue, Judge Teitelbaum decided
that Katz met all of the Rule 23(a) requirements. 52 F.R.D. at 514-15.
68. Id. at 517; 53 F.R.D. at 540-41.
69. 53 F.R.D. at 543-44.
70. The trial court certified the granting of Katz' motion for determination of a
class action for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292. Id. at 547. The Third Circuit
then granted Carte Blanche's petition for leave to appeal. Brief for Appellant at 11.
At the first hearing the appellate court also found that the trial court could proceed
with a class action to find Carte Blanche's liability, and at a later time could reexamine
the class action question as to any facet of the case. 41 U.S.L.W. 2661 (3d Cir., June
12, 1973). The court then granted Carte Blanche's petition for rehearing and vacated
its previous judgment. Appellant's Brief on Rehearing at 1.
71. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974) (slip
opinion at 25).
72. Id. at 27.
73. Id. at 21. The specific issue left open for possible class action treatment was
the business or consumer use of the credit card. Business use of credit is exempted
from the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970).
74. Civil No. 72-1054 at 21. The court outlined a bifurcated procedure with the
non-class action issue being decided first. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). The court
was not clear on the issue, but indicated that allegation of a class action for de-
termination of the business or consumer use of the credit card would continue to
toll the statute of limitation for the class members until the determination was
made for or against the class action. This was true even though the present class
action had been dismissed. Civil No. 72-1054 at 21-22.
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In effect, the Third Circuit imposed the Ratner procedure of de-
ciding the merits of the case before the motion for class action cer-
tification without the parties having agreed to the Ratner procedure.7 5
The court outlined in dicta a vague procedure which allows a trial
court to decide the merits before deciding the class action motion.
After plaintiff has moved for class action certification and if de-
fendant can show that its business would be harmed or disrupted by
Rule 23 notice, the Third Circuit indicated that the District Court
should pursue a procedural alternative to the class action absent
"compelling circumstances." 76 The Third Circuit suggested a test
case would be appropriate to decide Katz.7 7
Under the test case procedure, the judge stays all but one of the
suits upon the consent of all parties to be bound by the outcome of
that one case.78 The Katz trial court rejected a test case because the
potential class members were so numerous that their express consent
to be bound by the judgment in such a test case could not be ob-
tained.70 The appellate court answered this objection by saying that
the trial court's argument was based on the doctrine of mutuality
of estoppel, s0 and that the Supreme Court had discredited that doc-
trine8l in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation.s2 However, the Supreme Court limited its objection to
mutuality of estoppel in that case by two considerations. The Court
did not consider the question of "offensive" use of estoppel-allowing
a second plaintiff to establish liability by using "a judgment obtained
by a different plaintiff in a prior suit against the same defendant."83
75. See note 25 supra.
76. Civil No. 72-1054 at 24.
77. Id. at 20-21.
78. See Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 934
(1959). The case concerned an airplane collision involving multiple deaths. The parties
stipulated that they would be bound by the decision in the Miller test cases on the
issues of the liability of various defendants, and the application of the District of
Columbia's Wrongful Death Statute.
Professor Moore has noted that a test case is a "quasi-class action" with the direction
of the litigation being overseen by the litigants rather than the judge. The effec-
tiveness of the test case depends upon the sufficient private power of both sides
to enforce an agreement to abide by the outcome, and sufficient trial resources to
insure a full hearing. The test case "cannot insure that all the group's claims will
receive adequate, uniform disposition." 3B MOORe'S FEDERAL PRAclca 23.45[33, at
23-813 (1974).
79. 53 F.R.D. at 540-41. Note also that Katz did not involve multiple suits; other
plaintiffs had not asserted individual actions.
80. The Supreme Court has defined mutuality of estoppel as a judge-made doe-
trine "ordaining that unless both parties (or their privies) in a second action are
bound by a judgment in a previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in the second
action may use the prior judgment as determinative of an issue in the second action."
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1971).
81. Civil No. 72-1054 at 18-20.
82. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
83. Id. at 329-30.
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The procedure outlined by the Third Circuit clearly is "offensive"
use of estoppel. All members of the plaintiff class would be able to
use a judgment favorable to Katz to establish liability in subsequent
suits.8 4 The estoppel asserted in Blonder-Tongue was a defense to a
patent holder suit for infringement after the patent had been held
invalid, and the Supreme Court limited its decision to the patent
question before it.85 The Third Circuit is clearly outside the holding
of Blonder-Tongue. If the majority's mutuality of estoppel argument
is in error, then the only person bound by the Katz test case is Reuben
Katz.80
An additional objection follows from the Third Circuit's mutuality
of estoppel argument. Class members would be able to enter the liti-
gation after a decision on the merits in their favor, but would not
be bound by an unfavorable decision. 7 This attempt to reinstate
one-way intervention"8 in (b)(3) suits is in direct contravention to
Rule 23(c)(3). 9
As a practical matter the Third Circuit's approach may have little
value. The price exacted from the defendant for obtaining a pro-
cedural alternative to the class action is high. A decision unfavorable
to the defendant will be given effect in favor of the class; the statute
of limitations will have been tolled in favor of the class; 90 the de-
fendant will not have collateral estoppel protection for a judgment
in his favor;01 and defendant will have waived Seventh Amendment
rights to a unitary trial. 92 It would seem to be only an occasional
84. Civil No. 72-1054 at 21-22.
85. 402 U.S. at 350.
86. 53 F.R.D. at 540; cf. 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE fl 23.45[3], at 23-813 (1974).
87. Civil No. 72-1054 at 21-22.
88. One-way intervention has been defined as allowing parties to intervene after a
decision on the merits favorable to them, although they would be unaffected by
an unfavorable decision. The Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966).
89. Rule 23(c)(3) provides in part: "The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall in-
clude and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2)
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class." See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.60, at 23-1201 (1974);
The Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966).
90. See note 74 supra; note 121 infra.
91. In effect, if Carte Blanche wins on the issue of liability, the decision in Katz
will not protect it in subsequent actions by other plaintiffs. Civil No. 72-1054 at 21.
The procedure outlined by the Third Circuit suggests the defendant waives the de-
fense of collateral estoppel when he requests a procedural alternative to the class
action. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 21-22. There is some question as to the extent of the claimed Seventh
Amendment right. The court framed the unitary trial issue as a Seventh Amendment
right to have all issues of liability and damages tried before a single jury. Id. at 22.
However, the Third Circuit was overruled long ago on this view of the Seventh
Amendment. McKeon v. Central Stamping Co., 264 F. 385 (3d. Cir. 1920), overruled
sub nom. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931).
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defendant in rare circumstances who would be willing to pay that
price.
By reversing the District Court the Third Circuit joined the cases
denying class action status in alleged Truth in Lending violations.
However, the decision of the District Court in Katz, even though
reversed, remains important not only because it is an alternative to
the Ratner line of cases denying class action status, but also because
it has been followed by other cases.93 The District Court in Katz
essentially ignored the effect of the class action on potential Truth
in Lending damages by treating the issues of class action status and
liability as distinct. While the Katz approach does have the initial
appeal of maintaining a distinct line between substance and procedure,
Ratner correctly noted that the line is indistinct in Truth in Lending
cases.9 4 The line of cases following the District Court in Katz may
only postpone the large damages problem to another day.
Perhaps the most dangerous potential result of the Katz District
Court approach is the ultimate effect the class action decision may
have on the merits. The court may be less willing to impose liability
because of the effect the decision would have.90 Loose and incon-
sistent interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act poses the danger of restoring the pre-Truth in Lending
situation of varying definitions and usages of terms.96 The loss of
strict uniformity of disclosure would hinder the comparison shopping
by consumers that was envisaged by the Act.9 7
Another example of manipulation of substantive doctrine would
be a narrow definition of the term "violation." For example, if a
disclosure error were made on computer-printed statements, the error
in programming the computer may be defined as one error subject
to one recovery under the Act, regardless of how mafy times the pro-
gramming error is repeated in the printing and mailing of credit
93. Beard v. King Appliance Co., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 98,912 (E.D. Va.,
Nov. 27, 1973); McDermott v. Hollander, Civil No. 72-2062 Sec. C (E.D. La., June 28,
1973); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,055 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 14, 1973); Flickinger v. Horseshoe Dev.
Corp., Civil No. 11-334-C-1 (S.D. Iowa,, Mar. 10, 1972); Richardson v. Time Premium
Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,273 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
94. 54 F.R.D. at 416; 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[3], at 23-801 to 23-802
(1974).
95. Compare Richardson v. Time Premium Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,272, at 89,239 (S.D. Fla. 1971), with Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
96. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
97. Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70-C-1827 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 20,
1972); 113 CONG. Rac. 18399-400 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
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statements.98 This approach weakens the definition of "violation"
and negates the deterrent effect on creditors.99
No court as yet has allowed a class so large as to destroy financially
the defendant if liability were found. Indeed, the majority of cases
allowing class actions have involved a rather small class.' 00 Of course,
this does not resolve the problem of class actions under Truth in
Lending; the number of members in a given plaintiff class can hardly
serve as an adequate basis to decide class action status. If anything,
Rule 23 is more responsive to protecting the larger class.' 01
The one court that has allowed a class action in the face of heavy
penalties did so on the grounds that "discounting" the penalty by
relying on individuals to bring actions would only deny relief to
those potential plaintiffs most lacking in wealth and education.10 2
This is the opposite side of the Ratner coin with the court protecting
plaintiff's interests to the exclusion of defendant's interests. It would
seem that some sort of compromise is called for. However, as the one
case attempting to achieve a balance demonstrates, a compromise does
not necessarily mean a doctrinally satisfactory solution.
III
In Eovaldi v. First National Bank of Chicago,10 3 the court was faced
with an alleged Truth in Lending disclosure violation perpetrated
through a large-scale credit card system. Eovaldi alleged that the bank
had failed to mail a statement to the first BankAmericard holders for
April, 1971, with the result that 170,000 credit cardholders incurred
an additional month's interest. 0 4
The court found that the alleged class met Rule 23(b)(3)'s require-
ments, and specifically disagreed with Ratner by finding that the
98. Dole, supra note 30, at 919.
99. See p. 1416 supra.
100. See McDermott v. Hollander, Civil No. 722062 (E.D. La., June 28, 1973) (al-
leged class contained 223 members); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 307, 318 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (four separate classes alleged with memberships being
approximately 4,000, 2,500, 1,500 and 500 people); Settle v. Mallicott Auto Sales, Inc.,
[1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,089 (D. Ore. 1971)
(alleged class consisted of 96 persons with the award being .9,600 plus attorney's fees
and court costs).
101. See notes 24, 46 supra.
102. Beard v. King Appliance Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 98,912 (E.D. Va., Nov. 27, 1973). The reporter does not explain the
amount or nature of the penalties.
103. 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. I11. 1972), supplemented at Civil No. 71-C-1654 (N.D. Ill.,
June 15, 1973).
104. 57 F.R.D. at 546.
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class action was "superior." 10 5 Judge McMillan characterized the $100
minimum damages as punitive and noted that they possibly worked
to deprive defendants of their property without due process. 10 To
overcome this difficulty he agreed to let the class action proceed if
plaintiff would amend the complaint and sue only for actual damages.
But, he questioned whether Eovaldi could also waive the minimum
damages for the class.10°
In a subsequent proceeding the Bank attempted to strike Eovaldi's
disclaimer of liquidated damages.' 08 The court noted that there was
no controlling precedent for allowing the disclaimer'0 9 but denied
defendant's motion to strike. Judge McMillan ruled that if the liqui-
dated damages were indeed unconstitutional, then plaintiff really
had not waived anything."10 The court sidestepped the argument
that waiver of minimum damages by the class representative was
ineffective by defining the class Eovaldi was seeking to represent as
the class consisting of only those people who also would waive the
minimum damages."' The judge then noted that if Rule 23(e) 12
would allow a judge in his discretion to dismiss completely a class
action, it should allow him to permit the pleading of a rational com-
promise short of dismissal. 1 3 Finally, the court said that any error
could be remedied easily by either multiplication or nullification."14
Eovaldi represents an innovative attempt to retain class actions
under the Truth in Lending Act, but the attempt is not without diffi-
culty. To achieve its result Eovaldi twists the substance of Truth in
Lending as well as the procedure of Rule 23. The Truth in Lending
Act specifically provides that the relief "shall not be less than $100
105. Id. at 547. In disagreeing with Ratner, Judge McMillan initially observed that
the question of fairness of the punishment imposed by the Act had been decided by
Congress, and that the "horrendous punishment" question was not a valid considera-
tion under Rule 23(b)(3). He then noted that the class had 170,000 members and
that larger classes had been handled by the courts. He finally observed that the
most important issues in the suit were damages and attorney's fees, and that those
questions were best resolved by a class action.
106. Id. at 548.
107. Id.
108. Civil No. 71-C-1654.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Contra, Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592 (N.D.
111. 1972).
112. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
113. Civil No. 71-C-1654.
114. Id. Judge McMillan may be overly optimistic in his view that any error may
be easily corrected. The practical effect of the "easily correctible error" view may
be the same as that created by the District Court in Katz, i.e., the difficult decision
is just postponed to another day. See p. 1421 supra.
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. ,,"" There is simply no way to construe these words to permit
individual recoveries of less than $100, and Rule 23's grant of dis-
cretionary authority to a court does not extend to substantive rights.
Moreover, limiting the class to those who also will waive their statu-
tory damages raises several novel problems.
One of the first matters a court will have to determine is the
method of securing the waiver of damages by the class. Judge
McMillan's opinion implies that the notice sent to the class will
contain the waiver provision, and that a person will have to opt out
of the class to avoid the waiver.116 In other words, an absent member
of the class will waive his statutory right by doing nothing. This
result is inconsistent with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) which provides that a
person must affirmatively opt out of a class in order not to be in-
cluded in the judgment.117
The harm of this inconsistency is mitigated by the waiver of only
one form of relief, the statutory minimum penalty of $100. The
amended Eovaldi complaint still asks for double the amount of actual
damages incurred."18 But, by asking the parties to prove actual dam-
ages, in effect, the Eovaldi court may deny all meaningful relief. The
Truth in Lending Act does not frame relief in terms of actual dam-
ages, but in terms of the finance charge imposed in the particular
transaction." 9 The statute does not refer to actual damages because
it was recognized that damages for a disclosure violation are difficult
to prove. 20 The difficulty of proving actual damages may not only
discourage many persons from coming forward to allege damages, but
it may also deny relief to those who attempt but do not succeed in
their proof of damages.
The fear of abuse of the waiver thus becomes very real when the
effect of the difficulty of proving actual damages is combined with
the opt out method of obtaining waiver of statutory damages. And
by doing nothing, the class members may not only lose the relief
afforded by the statute, they will also be bound by the res judicata
effect of the decision.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
116. Civil No. 71-C-1654.
117. "[T]he judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). See Frankel, supra note 24,
at 299. See note 61 supra.
118. Civil No. 71-C-1654.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970). The finance charge is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1605
(1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (1973); see also Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp. of DeKalb,
54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
120. 119 CONG. REc. S14423 (daily ed. July 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
See note 41 supra.
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A further problem with the Eovaldi requirement of proof of actual
damages is that it imposes a heavy and unnecessary burden on the
court. Proof of individual damages, especially in a case of 170,000
individuals, is no easy task. If the Eovaldi complaint had asked for
recovery of twice the finance charge imposed in the transaction, as
contemplated by the Act, proof would be easily accessible to both the
parties and the courts by means of the bank's records.
A final concern for denial of relief by means of the Eovaldi waiver
relates to the statute of limitations. A class action tolls the statute of
limitations for those members of the class, named as well as un-
named.121 A person not wishing to waive his statutory damages who
thus disqualifies himself from the class might also lose the protection
of the tolled statute of limitations. This is particularly important in
Truth in Lending suits because the statute of limitations is one year 22
from the date of the extension of the credit . 2 3
The Eovaldi approach to allowing a class action demonstrates the
problem Truth in Lending has posed for the courts. The compromise
retains most of the essential provisions of both Truth in Lending and
Rule 23, but distorts both to achieve the result. The inability of the
courts to resolve the problem has returned the issue to Congress.
IV
The 1971 Report to Congress on Truth in Lending by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 12 4 called to Congress'
attention, apparently for the first time, the catastrophic results of the
interaction of class action law with the Truth in Lending Act.' 23 Just
a few months after receiving the report from the Board of Governors,
the Senate passed a bill amending the Truth in Lending Act to place
a ceiling on the damages recoverable in a class action. 26 The bill
provided for recovery of actual damages for the class and an additional
award not to exceed $100,000.127 The Senate bill died in a House
committee. 28
A similar bill, S. 2101, was introduced in the 93d Congress. 129 The
121. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 94 S. Ct. 756, 764 (1974).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
123. Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONSUMER CREDiT GuIDE 99,055 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
124. FRB, supra note 38.
125. Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
126. S.652, § 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
127. Id.
128. 118 CONe. REc. H3813 (daily ed. May 1, 1972).
129. S.2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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new bill again passed the Senate,1 30 and is currently before the House
Banking and Commerce Committee. 13' S. 2101 amends § 1640 of the
Truth in Lending Act to allow for actual damages. In an individual
action the amendment provides an additional award of twice the
amount of the finance charge imposed in the transactions with a
minimum award of $100 and maximum award of $1000. In a class
action actual damages may also be recovered, but there is no mini-
mum individual recovery. While not required to do so, the court
may also grant an additional award with the total recovery not to
exceed the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of the net worth of the
creditor.132 The amended section would still allow court costs and
attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs.133 To help determine the
amount of the additional award in a class action, the court is to con-
sider five factors: the amount of actual damages awarded, the fre-
quency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the
resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected,
and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was
intentional. 34
Two major concerns were expressed by the Senate in its report
and floor debates on this amendment. First, the Senate took note of
the trend away from class actions after Ratner and the need for po-
tential class action liability to encourage voluntary creditor com-
pliance.13 5 The Senate considered individual actions an insufficient
deterrent to large creditors, and so imposed a $100,000 or one percent
of net worth ceiling to provide sufficient deterrence without finan-
cially destroying the creditor. 36
A second concern of the Senate was that after Ratner consumers
were not receiving much relief because of the courts' reluctance to
allow class actions with their unreasonably high damages. 37 The ceil-
130. 119 CONG. REC. S14428 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
131. 119 CoNG. REC. H6588 (daily ed. July 24, 1973).
132. S.2101, § 208(a), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
133. Id. § 208(a)(4).
134. Id. § 208(a).
135. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973); 118 CONG. REc. S6911-12 (daily
ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Moss, sponsor of amendment to the bill); 119
CONG. REC. S14420 (daily cd. July 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Moss).
136. 118 CONG. REC. S6911 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Moss); 119
CONG. REC. S14420 (daily ed. July 23, 1973). The Senate rejected an amendment which
would have allowed a heavier penalty for violating Truth in Lending. In the case
of a class action it would have placed a ceiling of $50,000 or 1 percent of the
creditor's net worth, whichever was greater. In effect, the amendment would have
placed a ceiling of 1 percent of the creditor's net worth, while the bill placed a
ceiling of $100,000. 119 CONG. REc. S14424 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
137. S. REP. No. 278. 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1973); 119 CONG. Rc. S14420 (daily
ed. July 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Moss).
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ing on damages recoverable was thus also seen as a means of extending
consumer relief by making the class action feasible. The Senate ex-
plicitly rejected the alternative of abolishing class actions alleging
violations of Truth in Lending. 138
The Senate bill not only expresses a strong policy in favor of the
class actions but also removes the immediate problem the courts have
faced of huge damage awards. However, the bill may ultimately dis-
courage class actions..
Under S. 2101 the court may award class action litigants actual
damages, court costs and attorney's fees, plus an award not to exceed
$100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth. The first problem
with the legislation is the difficulty of proving actual damages. Actual
damages may be impossible to prove in the situation of a disclosure
violation under Truth in Lending.139 In addition S. 2101 may impose
upon the court the task of hearing proof of damages for each mem-
ber of the class.' 4 ° For a large class this raises serious manageability
problems.14 It is suggested that the class will not receive meaningful
relief on a wide scale under this section.
Further, by separating the actual damages from the "award" in the
structure of the amendment, the Senate clearly suggests that addi-
tional factors should be considered by the court before allowing any
additional award whatsoever.142 In the original damages section the
138. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
139. 119 CoNe. REc. S14423 (daily ed. July 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
See note 41 supra.
140. The Second Circuit's most recent Eisen opinion casts some doubt on the via-
bility of the fluid class recovery method for calculating and distributing damages,
and implicitly questions other damage calculation methods which eliminate the need
for individual proof of claims. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1011,
1013, 1017-18 (2d Cir.). Fluid class recoveries may never be needed after the Supreme
Court's decision that plaintiff must bear the cost of individual notice to all identifiable
members of the class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (U.S. May 28, 1974), in N.Y. Times,
May 29, 1974, at I, col. 5. The cost of individual notice will probably reduce the size
of the class sufficiently to make the fluid class recovery unnecessary.
141. One of the factors to be considered in determining whether to allow or dis-
allow a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of the class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Even if the members of
the class can be identified and reached by notice, the distribution of individual
damages may be so burdensome as to make the class action unmanageable. City of
Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71 (D.N.J. 1971). But see West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 721, 723-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). The problem of distributing
damages may be postponed until after liability is decided, or solved by subclasses
and the like. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(4); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 41 U.S.L.W.
2661 (3d Cir., June 12, 1973), rev'd on rehearing en banc, Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir.,
Mar. 15, 1974); Note, Manageability, supra note 51; Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:
"Frankenstein Monster" Posing as a Class Action, 33 U. PiTr. L. REv. 868 (1972).
142. S.652, the original bill to amend Truth in Lending, framed the damages
section in terms of h penalty imposed on a creditor in addition to the actual damages
of the consumer. J.L. Robertson, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, voiced concern that this damages section might make the
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amount recoverable was fixed. The amendment, however, draws a
distinction between actual damages and an additional penalty. Cer-
tainly the courts will require additional proof of willfulness or malice
before imposing a penalty in addition to actual damages. This will
make the successful prosecution of a civil action more difficult.
143
Finally, the courts will have difficulty determining the magnitude
of the "award." In an individual action the award is mandatory and
is the easily ascertainable figure of twice the finance charge, 144 within
the stated limits. However, in a class action the award is discretionary
and the amount of the award is based upon five rather ambiguous
and inconsistent categories.143 For example, the first category of actual
damages awarded may be inconsistent with the policy of limiting total
class action liability. If the actual damages awarded are high, the
policy to limit class action liability may require the award to be rela-
tively low. In effect this may make the penalty for a serious violation
lighter than the penalty for a minor violation.
All five factors suggest a balancing of considerations but there is
no indication of the weight to be accorded to each. For example,
frequency of failure to comply and the extent to which the violation
was intentional may be balanced against the resources of the creditor,
but there is no indication of how the scales are to be tipped. The
court has before it Senate policy considerations that could go either
way. If deterrence is the primary objective, then perhaps the resources
of the creditor should be given more weight-a relatively small award
may sufficiently deter a financially strapped creditor even though the
violation was intentional. On the other hand, if consumer relief is
the primary objective the other side of the equation may be favored.
This is not to suggest that the courts will be unable to handle these
considerations. The balancing of various factors does, however, bring
class action remedy hollow. Robertson noted that the punitive damages concept would
require the courts to find deliberate deception, gross negligence or the like, and
that this would make a civil suit more difficult to bring. 118 CONG. REC. S6913
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (letter from J.L. Robertson to Sen. Proxmire). In response
to this criticism, the damages section, § 208, was amended to replace the words
"punitive damages" with the word "award." 118 CONG. REc. S6914 (daily ed. Apr.
27, 1972).
While the word "award" may have removed the harsher implications of "punitive
damages," the practical effect on civil litigation remains the same. Both the structure
of § 208, which allows an award in addition to actual damages, and the concept of
an award carry the implication that additional proof beyond that required for actual
damages will be required for an award. It is not unlikely that the award will be
viewed as punitive by the courts, with the resultant effect feared by Robertson.
143. 118 CONG. REC. S6913 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (letter from J.L. Robertson
to Sen. Proxmire).
144. S.2101, § 208(a)(2)(A), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
145. See p. 1429 supra.
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out the contrast between the ease of fixing an individual award and
the difficulty of fixing a class award. Certainly, the burden of proof
placed on named class action litigants to sustain an award is greater
than that placed on individual litigants. The combined effect of the
difficulty of proving actual damages and the additional burden of
justifying any additional award may be enough to deny effectiveness
to the class action remedy.
Even if the class is able to surmount these difficulties, several prob-
lems remain unanswered concerning the distribution of the award.
For example, only those who have successfully proved actual damages
may receive part of the award, or it may be divided among all mem-
bers of the class irrespective of their ability to prove actual damages.
The award could be divided either equally or pro rata according
to a factor assessing the harm done. If the class is large, as in Katz,
the cost of distribution to each person might cost more than each
person would be entitled to receive. 14(1 The class may be so large that
even the maximum award of $100,000 would not be sufficient to
confer any benefit on the class members, or even satisfy their claims
for actual damages.147 If the award fund is not practically distribut-
able, a court will then be faced with the question of its use or ulti-
mate disposition.
V
The best way to solve the current problem of class actions under
Truth in Lending would be to amend Section 1640(a).148 Two
146. If, for example, a court had before it a class of 800,000, the $100,000 divided
equally would entitle each person to a 12.50 award. The cost of first class mail alone
would amount to l0€ per person.
147. The class members could be denied any real benefits in at least two ways.
First, the class could be so numerous that the 5100,000 award would allow only a
negligible amount per person. See note 146 supra. Second, the larger the class the
smaller the amounts of actual damages recoverable. A class of 10,000 people can rc-
cover a maximum of $10 per person. There are two additional limitations to the
above discussion. First, the limit of 1 percent of the creditor's net worth may force
a recovery much smaller than $100,000. Second, the cost of notice to the plaintiff
class will also be deducted from the recovery making the amount distributable even
smaller. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 725, 731, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
148. A suggested amendment to § 1640(a) is (amendment in italics):
(I) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction,
except [that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor
greater than $1000;]
(A) in the case of an individual action the liability under this paragraph shall
not be less than $100 nor greater than $1000, or
(B) in the case of a class action there shall be no minimum recovery as to each
member of the class and the total recovery shall not be more than the lesser
of $100,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the creditor, Provided that if
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amendments to S. 2101 would solve the problems of the bill. The
amendment to § 1640(a) should retain the liquidated damages struc-
ture of § 1640(a) rather than adopt the penalty structure of S. 2101.
This would avoid the problem S. 2101 creates by requiring proof of
actual damages. The amendment should also retain the finance charge
imposed in the transaction as the basic measure of damages. 140 This
would ease the burden on the parties of proving actual damages and
ensure an effective remedy. It would greatly ease the administrative
burden on the court by allowing damage calculations to be made from
the defendants' business records. It would also serve a secondary pur-
pose of facilitating settlement in that the parties would know the
specific amount of potential liability should the case go to trial.
Finally, the finance charge measure of damages would provide a use-
ful yardstick for the courts to measure the superiority of Rule 23(b)(3)
class action over other procedures. If the proposed recovery is too
small to benefit the class members, either because the finance charge
is de minimis' 50 or the class is so numerous that the $100,000 or
one percent ceiling would make the individual amounts negligible,15'
the general class is so numerous that twice the finance charge in connection with
the transaction for each member would equal a sum greater than $100,000 or one
per centurn of the net worth of the creditor, the recovery for each member shall
be reduced pro rata so that the sum of the awards to all general class members
is not greater than the lesser of $100,000 or one per centum of the net worth
of the creditor; and
The proviso in amended subsection (1)(B) raises the possibility of potential plaintiffs
accentuating minimal class or substantive legal differences in order to bring more
than one action, and thereby receiving more than a S100,000 award. However, the
proposed amendment should be considered in context with the other proposed amend-
mients to Truth in Lending contained in S.2101. Section 207 of S.2101 provides that
multiple disclosure violations for one credit account will limit each person affected to
a single recovery. 119 CONG. REG. S14430 (daily ed. July 23, 1973). Contra, Thomas v.
Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1973). Section 207 would
obviate most of the problem of proliferating awards. It should also be assumed that
class differences should result in the division of the general class into subclasses, with
the general class being limited to one award of $100,000 or 1 percent of the creditor's
net worth. On the formation of subclasses, see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299
(2d Cir. 1968); City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 235 (E.D. Pa.
1970); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
149. It is not clear why the Senate changed the measure of damages from the
finance charge to actual damages. The change could have been a response to pressure
by the credit industry to leave the law as it was. The credit industry's theory is that
class actions for other than actual damages were inappropriate and would become
illegal. The change therefore could be seen as a move to preserve the class action.
S. REp. No. 278, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1973). The Senate debates on the civil lia-
bility section of S2101 shed no light on the change to actual damages. See 119
CONG. REc. S14419-21 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
150. In Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1972), the
finance charge imposed in the transaction in issue was 130. Twice the finance charge,
or 260, would not justify the time or effort spent to determine the issue. See note
152 infra.
151. See notes 146, 147 supra.
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then an administrative action, an individual action, or another pro-
cedure would probably be superior. 152
As the history of the current Senate bill demonstrates, it may be
some time before Congress acts on the class action problem. In fact,
the Ratner line of cases denying class action status may have decreased
Congress' sense of urgency to correct the problem of class actions
under Truth in Lending. 153 The courts are left with the dilemma of
reconciling an expressed public policy favoring class actions under
Truth in Lending" with the minimum damages provision and re-
sultant heavy damages.
The courts are not faced, as the Eovaldi court has demonstrated,
with an impossible situation. A canon of statutory construction creates
*a presumption against rendering a statute ineffective, or inefficient,
or reading the statute so as to cause grave public injury or incon-
venience. 155 Construing § 1640(a) to allow "horrendous" damages
greatly increases the inefficiency of the Act; annihilation of major
credit institutions causes a grave public injury. By interpreting §
1640(a) to allow a waiver similar to that used in Eovaldi, Truth in
Lending is made more efficient and the public injury is avoided.
A waiver, similar to that used in Eovaldi, is supportable on several
grounds despite its troublesome doctrinal problems. First, if the mini-
152. Other procedures that should be considered when evaluating the desirability
of a class action are listed in Weinstein, supra note 24, at 438-48. In the Truth in
Lending situation where damages may be widespread but negligible in amount, al-
ternative procedures to correct the disclosure violation include a private civil suit,
a criminal suit, 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970), and enforcement by an administrative agency.
15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970).
The problem of the cost of notice depleting the amount recoverable by the class
might also enter at this stage. If, as in Ratner, the merits have been decided before
the determination of class action status, then the amount of recovery minus the cost
of notice may be the yardstick to measure the appropriateness of the class action.
Resolution of who should bear the cost of notice is a far more difficult issue when
the question arises before a decision on the merits. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
the Supreme Court held the plaintiff must bear the cost of individual notice to all
identifiable members of the class. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
153. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
154. See pp. 1429-30 supra. After Ratner the courts allowed very few class actions
to go forward. See note 19 supra. However, after the introduction of S.652 to the
Senate, see note 126 supra, the courts have become more favorably disposed to class
actions, allowing them to go forward in the following cascs: Beard v. King Ap-
pliance Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 98,912
(E.D. Va., Nov. 27, 1973); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 98,981 (W.D. Pa., Aug. 6, 1973); McDermott v. Hollander,
Civil No. 72-2062 (E.D. La., June 28, 1973); Smith v. International Magazine Serv. of
Mid Atl., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,249
(N.D.W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1973).
155. United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214, 217 (1939); Bird v. United States, 187
U.S. 118, 124 (1902).
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mum damages provision as amplified by the class action deprives de-
fendants of property without due process of law,156 the class members
have waived nothing.
The waiver also protects the interest of the members of the class.
If minimum damages are waived in favor of twice the finance charge
imposed in the transaction, rather than twice the actual damages as
the Eovaldi court required, the class members are assured that their
interest will be protected. 157 If the minimum damages are not waived,
the class faces total denial of relief by either a Ratner rejection of the
class action or a potential denial of substantive relief. 58 If any class
member chooses not to waive the minimum damages he is theoretically
able to sue on his own, and if he is successful, court costs and the fees
of his attorney will be paid by the defendant.15 9
Public policy also strongly favors a solution allowing the class action
to go forward. Class actions have been used to deter public wrongs
and compensate widescale injuries in the antitrust laws,160 the securi-
ties laws' 1 and the civil rights laws. 1 2 Truth in Lending, when vio-
lated with resultant public wrong and widescale injuries, also should
be enforced by class actions. Denial of class action status rewards a
guilty defendant with the fruits of his wrongdoing and leaves plain-
tiffs uncompensated for their injuries. 63 The effect is denial of relief
to a legitimate legal claim.
The major difficulty with the statutory construction solution to
the Truth in Lending class action problem is that it is blatant judicial
legislation. Section 1640(a) provides that the minimum recovery "shall
156. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, Civil No. 71-C-1654 (N.D. Ill., June
15, 1973).
157. See p. 1427, notes 135-37 supra.
158. See p. 1424 supra.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970). However, note the possible statute of limitations
problems. See p. 1428 supra.
160. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414
U.S. 908 (1973); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Handler, The Shift
From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971); Weinstein, supra note 46, at
301; Note, supra note 24, at 353. Cases not allowing antitrust class actions include
School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001(E.D. Pa. 1967); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
161. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d
161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Weinstein, supra note 46, at 301;
Note, supra note 24, at 362.
162. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Taylor v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 333 F. Supp. 83 (D. Colo. 1971).
163. See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 68 (D.N.J. 1971).
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not be less than $100."114 The foregoing arguments have all been
based on construction of the terms of a statute, and § 1640(a) does
not leave room for "construction." Another canon of statutory con-
struction provides that when the words of a statute fairly permit only
one interpretation, lurking problems do not permit judicial disregard
of what Congress commands.115 If the courts were to pay strict heed
to the expressed policy favoring class actions and also to the explicit
words of § 1640(a) the resulting "horrendous" damages would return
the problem to Congress.
At least one additional approach remains open to the courts-the
exercise of Rule 23's discretionary powers.1 66 In a class action alleging
antitrust violations Judge Fullam limited potential damages by in-
cluding in the class notice'0 7 a requirement that class members file
within a reasonable time a statement of intent to prove damages. 1 8
The size of the class would be determined by the number of class
members filing the statement of intent. Even though this approach
abridges the Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requirement that a class member is
included in the class unless he requests exclusion, it is certainly a bet-
ter alternative than total denial of relief to all class members.
Another alternative might be to return unclaimed proceeds of a
settlement or judgment to the defendant.169 The liability of a de-
fendant and the damages owed are determined on a class scale, achiev-
ing the Rule 23 purpose of judicial economy. 170 The individual must
then step forward to prove his claim. This lessens the defendant's
liability burden to the extent claims are not pressed. Presumably an
individual notified of the action and still not interested enough to
press his own claim has waived his right to relief.
The difficulty with the solution lies in allowing the defendant to
retain the fruits of his wrongdoing. However, Judge Lord included
in the Rule 23(c)(2) notice a provision that unless damage claims were
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
165. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 589 (1957).
166. CCH MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1A3, at 15 (1973); Miller, Problems
in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(bX3), 54
F.R.D. 501, 512 (1972); Note, supra note 55, at 443. See also Order of Feb. 28, 1966, 383
U.S. 1031, 1034 (Black, J., dissenting).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
168. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). This case and procedure are cited with favor by Handler, supra note 161, at 11.
169. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
170. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON RULE 23 or
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
REvIsED DRAFT OF RULE 23, at 5-6 (1973); Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's
Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 515, 519-20 (1969); Note, supra note 51, at 411.
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filed within a reasonable time, the state Attorney General, as the
representative of individuals in the class not filing a claim would
be authorized to expend the unclaimed damages as the court may
direct.171
However, authorizing the class representative to claim the damages
and expend them for the benefit of the class would not solve the
problem of class actions under Truth in Lending. The object is to
reduce the damage award so as not financially to destroy a defendant.
A defendant would be just as easily destroyed if the money went to
the class representative as if it went to the individual class members.
Returning the unclaimed proceeds of a judgment or settlement to the
defendant would alleviate the burden.
There are no easy solutions available to a court by exercising its
discretionary powers under Rule 23. Limiting class size by an opt in
requirement, or returning unclaimed damages to the defendant, may
deny relief to those least able to protect themselves legally-the poor
and the uninformed. The exercise of discretionary powers may also
create precedents adversely affecting Rule 23. The Third Circuit in
Katz would void Rule 23(c)(3) with its judicial reinstatement of one-
way intervention in (b)(3) suits. 7 2 The Rule 23(c)(1) requirement
also was strained 73 by postponing the class action determination until
after a decision of the merits.17 4
Conclusion
Judicial efforts to reconcile Rule 23 with Truth in Lending cases
for the most part have been unsatisfactory; the modifications of both
the substance of Truth in Lending and the procedure of Rule 23
have been too great. The task of modifying the substance of the Truth
171. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 296, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 710, 725 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), a!!'d, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., Inc., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
172. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974) (slip
opinion at 18-19, 21); see note 89 supra.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires that the class action determination be made
as soon as possible after commencement of the action. The time for determining the
class action will vary from case to case. 3B MooRE's FDEaRAL PRACTIcE 23.50, at
23-1102 (1974). However, the (c)(l) discretionary power to alter or amend an order, or
to make it conditional is exercisable only before the decision on the merits. The
inference is that, normally, the class action determination will be made before the de-
cision on the merits.
174. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., Civil No. 72-1054 (3d Cir., Mar. 15, 1974).
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in Lending Act belongs to Congress. Judicial formulation of a "new"
Rule 23 specifically for Truth in Lending cases is at best a dubious
undertaking. Absent a clear word from Congress, the accommodation
of Rule 23 to Truth in Lending that is eventually achieved will be
a second best solution, one doing the least doctrinal damage to the
provisions involved. To the extent Rule 23 is accommodated to
Truth in Lending, courts should be chary of applying those accom-
modations to other substantive areas, such as antitrust, where the
problem of minimum statutory damages does not exist.
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